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1. Introduction  
 
Neoclassical valuation theory postulates that investors calculate a projection of earnings, 
determine its present value, and trade accordingly. An assumption of this framework is that the 
distribution of expected earnings can be fully calculated from available information, and so decisions 
are made in conditions of risk. However, in some cases the available information may be of low 
quality, and investors will be unable to confidently pin down the exact distribution of expected 
earnings. In these cases decisions are made in conditions of ambiguity. Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
show theoretically that in such conditions pricing will be initially pessimistic due to ambiguity 
aversion,
 2
 with this pessimism being corrected with an upward price movement as ambiguity 
gradually subsides.  
 
A pattern observed in stock market data is a “size effect” around earnings announcements 
(Ball and Kothari, 1991; Atiase 1985; Foster et al., 1984; Bergman et al., 2008). Ball and Kothari 
(1991) find that smaller firms have higher abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
compared to larger firms, irrespective of the sign or magnitude of the earnings surprise. This size 
effect is puzzling because it is of considerable economic magnitude and does not appear to reflect 
compensation for risk. Foster et al (1984) extend this result and show that the unconditional upward 
movement in the prices of small companies begins months before the earnings announcements. In this 
paper we provide an ambiguity based explanation for this finding. Our hypothesis is that the analyst 
forecasts for smaller companies used by investors to form earnings expectations
3
 are relatively more 
ambiguous because there is less ‘hard’ information with which to estimate forecast accuracy 
                                                 
2  Ambiguity aversion is one of the most well-established results in behavioural economics. A large literature, starting with 
Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921), and continuing through Ellsberg (1961) and up to the present day (Ahn et al., 2009), 
shows that situations that involve ambiguity are treated differently from those that involve risk. Hsu et al. (2005) present 
evidence that ambiguous situations produce a unique neurological fingerprint, suggesting that ambiguity aversion is rooted in 
the fundamentals of human cognition. See Camerer and Weber (1992) and Keren and Gerritsen (1999) for reviews on the 
evidence on ambiguity aversion. 
3 The importance of analyst forecasts to investors is evident from the robust evidence that they exert a powerful influence on 
asset prices (Givoly and Lakonishok, 1979; Stickel, 1992; Gleason and Lee, 2003). The impact of analyst forecasts is so 
large that it is common in the finance literature to treat analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for market expectations (Livnat and 
Mendenhall, 2006).  
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(something which we estimate quantitatively).
4 
These forecasts are consequently priced 
pessimistically due to ambiguity aversion. As the quarter comes to a close and more information 
about upcoming earnings is revealed, ambiguity is gradually resolved and so the stock prices of 
smaller companies drift upwards to correct this pessimism, generating the documented size effect.                                                                                                             
 
Our first test examines whether smaller firms are likely to be perceived as more ambiguous by 
investors. It is motivated by Daniel Ellsberg’s (1961) proposal that when there is little reliable 
information about the relative likelihood of events, decision makers will feel they face ambiguity.
5
 In 
our framework the event of interest is a forecast, and the likelihood of interest is its accuracy. When 
this accuracy can be predicted from available information, there is no ambiguity. On the other hand, 
when the information is of low quality and cannot produce reliable estimates of accuracy there is 
ambiguity. In this paper we estimate expected accuracy using the model proposed by Clement and Tse 
(2003), and then examine how this estimate predicts actual accuracy for small and large companies. 
We show that the relationship between estimated and actual accuracy is significantly weaker for 
smaller companies, which amounts to higher ambiguity.  
 
We then examine whether forecasts for small companies elicit pessimistic valuations. Our 
hypothesis, based on ES, is that when investors receive a forecast for a small company they will 
overweight the worst-case scenario and respond pessimistically. If, therefore, the forecast brings “bad 
news” (i.e., an earnings decrease), the worst case scenario is that it is very accurate whereas if it 
brings “good news” (i.e., an earnings increase), the worst case scenario is that it is very inaccurate. In 
both cases the resulting stock price would be too low relative to the price that would be achieved in 
the absence of ambiguity. Therefore, as ambiguity subsides when the quarter comes to a close prices 
will rise to correct the previous pessimism. On the contrary, when the forecast is targeted toward large 
                                                 
4
 Along these lines various authors have suggested that the information environment of smaller companies is poorer 
(Atiase, 1980, 1985; Zhang, 2006; Hong et al., 2000). 
5
 Frisch and Baron (1988) proposed that “ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is 
relevant and could be known” (P. 1988). Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) suggest that ambiguous situations arise when the 
available information is vague, and does not allow one to confidently rule out alternative possibilities, while Gärdenfors and 
Sahlin (1982, 1983) argue that feelings of ambiguity are produced when the relevance of the available information is low.  
For all these authors the underlying theme is that ambiguity is negatively related to what might be called the “richness” of 
the information that can be used to compute the likelihood of interest. 
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companies the initial response will not be pessimistic; therefore such a pattern should not arise. Our 
results confirm this hypothesis. The appendix presents a stylized theoretical model of subjective 
beliefs that formalizes this prediction. 
 
Our study makes two contributions. Firstly, our evidence highlights that the distribution of 
expected earnings of smaller companies is (relatively) more ambiguous.
 
Moreover, the evidence that 
the pricing of these forecasts is consistent with pessimism suggests that investors have (negative) 
preferences toward this ambiguity, contradicting Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) and Bayesian 
updating. Jointly, this evidence supports the notion that the size effect around earnings 
announcements is related to ambiguity aversion. 
 
Secondly, our study contributes to the literature on ambiguity aversion, which mainly uses 
theoretical or experimental tools of analysis (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Sarin and Weber, 1993; 
Chen and Epstein, 2002). One exception to this is an important recent study by Anderson et al (2009), 
who decompose market returns into a risk and an ambiguity premium, and conclude that the latter is 
more important.  Anderson et al (2009) use a market-wide measure of ambiguity and thus focus their 
analysis on market returns. Our study complements theirs by illustrating the importance of ambiguity 
and ambiguity aversion at the company level. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our methodology, 
defines the variables used and describes the sample. Section 3 presents and discusses the results, and 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and Data  
2.1 Are small companies more ambiguous than larger ones? 
As explained in the introduction we use the model proposed by Clement and Tse (2003) to estimate 
forecast accuracy using available information, and then examine how well this estimate predicts actual 
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accuracy for companies of different size. Firstly, we use their method to standardise the variables used 
to predict forecast accuracy (Clement and Tse, 2003; 2005):                                                                          
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Where AFE is Absolute Forecast Error, defined as |(Forecasted earnings–Actual earnings)/Actual 
earnings|, and i indexes the specific company,  j the analyst and t the period of the forecast. The 
accuracy of a given forecast is given by the absolute value of its forecast error (AFEijt), subtracted 
from the maximum AFE for that company and period issued by any analyst, divided by the range of 
absolute errors for forecasts for that period. Accuracy ranges from 0 to 1, where a higher value 
indicates higher accuracy. For each forecast we then measure eight variables that Clement and Tse 
(2003) have shown to predict accuracy. In our context these variables constitute the information set 
from which investors can estimate expected accuracy: 
1) Forecast horizon: the days that separate a forecast from its corresponding earnings 
announcement date.   
2)  Days elapsed: the days intervening between a forecast and the previous forecast issued by any 
analyst for the same company and period.  
3) Lag accuracy: the value of Accuracy for the analyst j’s last forecast for a company i in the 
previous period.  
4) Firm experience: the number of quarters that analyst j has been covering company i. 
5)  Broker size: the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house in which the analyst 
belonged in period t.   
6) Forecast frequency: the number of forecasts issued by analyst j for company i in period t. 
7)  Industries: the number of industries (4-digit SIC) that analyst j is following in period t.   
8) Companies: the number of companies that analyst j is following in period t. 
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All these variables (except Lag accuracy) are standardised to vary between 0 and 1 using the 
following formula
6
:  
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We use the standardized variables to estimate the predicted accuracy of each forecast using 
the following cross sectional regression in each year t (subsuming analyst and company subscripts):
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Using these coefficients and constant, we then derive the Expected Accuracy of forecasts issued in 
year t+1 as in Brown (2001): 
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Expected Accuracy
   
is therefore an estimate of forecast accuracy using information available to the 
investor. As explained, ambiguity arises to the degree that expected accuracy (Equation 4) deviates 
from actual accuracy (Equation 1). To examine whether company size predicts ambiguity in this 
sense, we regress Actual Accuracy on Expected Accuracy using dummy variables for company size:
8
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6 For example, if an analyst who issues a forecast for IBM in the first quarter of 2000 follows 3 industries, and the IBM-
covering analyst who, for the same period, covers the fewest industries covers 2 industries, and the one who covers the most 
industries covers 10, then for this analyst Industries would equal (3 – 2)/ (10 – 2) = 0.125.  
7 For simplicity we estimate the regression yearly, as opposed to quarterly, because accounting quarters frequently 
correspond to different calendar months for different companies. 
8 To identify the levels of ambiguity we split our sample into quintiles based on company size (using the breakpoints from 
Kenneth French’s website in month t to assign the forecasts in month t+1).   
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Where Middle is a dummy that equals 1 if the size of the company belongs in the 2nd, 3rd or 4th 
quintile (i.e., is of intermediate size) and Small equals 1 if company is in the 1
st
 quintile. The 
coefficient of “predictability”, θ1, shows how well expected accuracy (Equation 4) predicts actual 
accuracy (Equation 1) for the low ambiguity (i.e., largest) companies. We predicted that as ambiguity 
increases, this relationship would become weaker, so that θ3 < θ2 < 0. That is, the smaller the 
company, the less predictable is accuracy from available information, and therefore the greater the 
ambiguity.    
 
Our test of ambiguity is based on the notion that the market uses available information to 
estimate forecast accuracy. If so, it then identifies whatever relationship exists between firm size and 
the predictability of forecast accuracy. Although there is already evidence that investors use the 
information cues from Equation 4 to estimate forecast accuracy (see Clement and Tse, 2003; Bonner 
et al., 2003; Mikhail et al., 2003, 2004), we also test whether these relationships emerge in our sample 
using the regression proposed by Clement and Tse (2003). Specifically we regress event time returns 
(-1, 1) interacted with revision magnitude on the accuracy-related variables in equation 3. If the 
market is using this information we should observe that variables that predict higher accuracy have a 
higher impact on returns. The regression is of the form: 
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2.2. Market reaction to ambiguity 
To examine whether a size effect arises in response to analyst forecasts, we group these forecasts 
according to the size of the targeted company and then perform a two-stage event study.
9
 The post-
forecast trading period is divided into an impact stage during which we expect pessimism due to 
ambiguity aversion to be priced, and an adjustment stage during which the pessimistic response will 
                                                 
9 Company size is measured as price  shares outstanding three days prior to the release of a forecast revision. 
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be corrected. The impact stage includes trading days -2 to 2 where 0 is the day the forecast is issued, 
and the adjustment stage includes days 3 to 20.
10
 For each stage we compute risk adjusted returns 
using the modified market model. 
 
In the adjustment period ambiguity is partly resolved because the end of the quarter nears and 
new information is released about upcoming earnings. This rationale is supported by the empirical 
evidence in Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Campbell et al (2008), who show that prices move in the 
direction of the earnings surprise months before the announcement, consistent with an expansion in 
the information set. We argue that this expansion prompts the market to revise its expectation to a less 
pessimistic level so the prices after ambiguous forecasts will on average drift upward, irrespective of 
the sign of these forecasts. The model in the appendix demonstrates that such an upward movement is 
not consistent with a Bayesian model with risk, but can be explained by a framework which 
incorporates ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. 
 
An analogous adjustment period is used by ES in their example regarding the response of the 
market to the 9/11 events. ES explain that initially investors faced ambiguity in terms of the economic 
consequences of these events and, being averse to ambiguity, they priced stocks pessimistically. With 
the passage of time this ambiguity was resolved and the market upwardly adjusted it’s valuation to a 
less pessimistic level. Our event study design is aimed to capture an analogous (but much more 
mundane) pattern of pessimism-and-correction around analyst forecasts. 
 
2.3 Multivariate analysis 
Our univariate analysis is complemented by controls for other variables known to affect post-revision 
returns (Clement and Tse, 2003). CAR, in the equation below, is the market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return for company j at time t after the forecast revision issued by analyst i. Our variable of 
interest is the inverse logarithm of company size. Our control variables are: average quoted bid ask 
                                                 
10 When examining the impact of an event it is customary to define a window around the event as the event period to capture 
information leakages and gradual information diffusion (e.g. Sorescu and Subrahmanyam, 2006). We use a somewhat wider 
window (i.e., -2, 2, instead of -1, 1) to allow the price to absorb the information. 
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spread for the twenty-day period prior to the issuance of the forecast (to control for potential liquidity 
effects), forecast horizon (the days intervening between a forecast revision and the earnings 
announcement), broker size (the number of analysts employed by the brokerage house employing the 
analyst who issued a forecast) and the absolute value of the revision magnitude ((new revision − old 
revision)/old revision). In addition, we control for analyst forecast bias (signed forecast error) to 
ensure that the pricing patterns we document are due to ambiguity aversion and not to analysts 
systematically under predicting earnings (Matsumoto, 2002). The multivariate regression is of the 
form:  
ijtijt6ijt5ijt4
ijt3ijt2
1
ijt10ijt
uvMagnReError.ForSizekerBro
Horizon.ForBidAsksizelogCAR

                                        (7) 
 
We conduct two regressions: for returns during the adjustment stage separately for upward 
and downward forecasts. To reduce the effect of correlated residuals due to the panel nature of our 
dataset in all regressions we cluster on the firm level and use year fixed effects. 
 
2.4 Sample construction and descriptive statistics 
Data on all quarterly US analyst forecast revisions and actual earnings are collected from the IBES 
detail files. The sample period spans from January 1995 to March 2008.
11
  Data on returns and shares 
outstanding are from CRSP. We apply the following filters to the sample: First, a company must have 
data from both CRSP and IBES. Second, if the forecast estimation date is after the earnings 
announcement date the observation is deleted. Third, all revisions greater than 100% and all revisions 
which entail an error in excess of 100% of the actual earnings are removed from the sample as these 
are likely to be erroneous according to Capstaff et al. (1995). Fourth, all revisions equal to 0 are 
deleted. After the above standardizations, and consistent with other studies (Clement and Tse, 2003; 
Clement, 1999; O’Brien, 1990), only the last forecast issued by each analyst-firm pair for each quarter 
is retained. In addition, we impose a minimum forecast horizon of 30 days (to eliminate the effect of 
                                                 
11 Similar to Clement and Tse (2003) we choose 1995 as the cut-off point to ensure that the issuance date of the revision 
reported in the IBES files is accurate.  
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the earnings announcement), and a maximum of 90 days (to avoid stale forecasts). After these filters 
are applied, we end up with 264,963 earnings forecast revisions. This number may change slightly 
depending on the variables required for each test, and this information is provided in each table. 
 
Table 1, Panel A, presents descriptive statistics for the variables used. The means and 
medians for the accuracy related variables are comparable to those of Clement and Tse (2003).  The 
average revision is -4.34%, and the average forecast error is -4.51%. These figures are consistent with 
prior evidence (e.g., Richardson et al., 2004; Matsumoto, 2002). In terms of company size we observe 
that the mean size decile rank (using end of previous month breakpoints) for the firms in the sample is 
6.5, which indicates the sample is slightly tilted towards large companies. This is a common finding 
when IBES data are used because large companies have larger analyst coverage. However, the sample 
does include small firms, as 25% are below a decile rank of 4. Panel B, shows the annual frequency of 
analyst forecasts according to revision direction and company size. Our sample contains 150,554 
downward forecasts and 114,409 upward ones.  
 
 [Please insert Table 1 here] 
3. Results  
3.1. Estimating forecast ambiguity 
In this section we examine whether small companies are indeed more ambiguous than larger ones. 
Before moving on to the main test we replicate previous results that forecast accuracy can be partly 
predicted from previous information. Table 2 shows the output from applying the model shown in 
regression 3 to the full sample. Consistent with earlier research (Clement and Tse, 2003), we find that 
accuracy increases with broker size, forecast frequency and lag accuracy, and decreases with the 
number of industries and companies followed by the analyst, days elapsed and forecast horizon. These 
relationships are highly significant, which confirms that forecast accuracy is partly predictable from 
available information. 
 
[Please insert Table 2 here] 
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We next examine whether the market responds to factors that predict forecast accuracy. We 
estimate Equation 6, whereby we regress the market adjusted cumulative return from days -1 to 1 (0 
being the forecast release date) on the accuracy factors interacted with revision magnitude. The results 
show that the market responds more strongly to forecasts issued from larger brokerage houses, to 
analysts with greater lagged accuracy and to analysts who issue more forecasts during the quarter. It 
responds less strongly to analysts who follow many industries, and to forecasts with more days 
elapsed.
12
 These results suggest that investors use these accuracy-related factors to estimate expected 
earnings.  
[Please insert Table 3 here] 
We now estimate whether company size is associated with the predictability of forecast 
accuracy. Table 4 shows estimates of the model in Equation 5. The coefficient of predictability, θ1, for 
large companies (low ambiguity forecasts) is 0.716. Since a coefficient of 1 indicates a perfect fit, this 
suggests that the available information for larger companies can be used to predict forecast accuracy 
fairly precisely. The coefficient is significantly lower for mid-sized companies as it decreases by -
0.104 (p-value <0.0001), and much lower for small ones as it decreases by -0.237 (p-value <0.0001).  
In other words, the predictability of forecast accuracy from expected accuracy drops by 33% when 
moving from the largest to the smallest companies, hence the forecast accuracy of smaller companies 
is less predictable than that of larger ones.  This means that the factors that the market is using to 
predict forecast accuracy are of lower quality when the forecast is targeted toward smaller companies. 
According to the definitions of ambiguity provided by Ellsberg and others this implies that ambiguity 
rises as one moves from larger to smaller companies.  
 
[Please insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 However, as reported by previous studies such as Clement and Tse (2003), we find that in some cases the market responds 
more strongly to variables that are less predicative of accuracy. For example, the market reacts more strongly to forecasts 
issued earlier in the quarter. See Clement and Tse (2003) for possible explanations.  
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3.2. Impact and adjustment stage returns by ambiguity proxy  
 
Table 5 presents market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for equally weighted portfolios 
formed according to company size for the impact (-2, 2) and the adjustment (3, 20) stages for upward 
and downward forecasts respectively.  Responses to ambiguity should be visible on impact period 
returns as well, i.e., the impact of downward forecasts for small companies should exceed that of 
upward forecasts. This prediction, however, can only be made if we assume that the only dimension 
that varies when we compare upward and downward forecasts is the sign of the revision. In reality 
however, this assumption is not likely to hold, as upward forecasts may on average be viewed more 
positively than downward forecasts are viewed negatively.
 13
 So, even if returns after downward 
forecasts for smaller companies do not exceed in absolute value returns after upward forecasts (as we 
actually observe in the data), it may still be the case that the response to the former (latter) is stronger 
(weaker) than what it should be in the absence of ambiguity.  For this reason we test our hypothesis 
based on patterns of adjustment in prices that are indicative of previous mispricings, as is common in 
the literature (i.e., Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
 
Adjustment period returns are analyzed in Panel B. For upward forecasts, return continuations 
occur exclusively amongst smaller companies, while for larger ones adjustment stage returns are close 
to zero. This generates an economically and statistically significant size effect, equal to 0.72%. A 
similar picture emerges when we consider downward revisions. For large companies, adjustment 
stage returns for all magnitude categories are negative, indicating that prices continue to drop in the 
adjustment stage. However, as we move toward smaller companies the returns become positive, 
creating a significant size effect, equal to 0.81%. This again shows that prices in the adjustment stage 
for small companies increase substantially. In short, and as predicted, the returns of small companies 
                                                 
13
 This is consistent with a well known finding in the analyst forecast literature is that analysts initially issue optimistic 
forecasts, and gradually walk them down as the quarter comes to a close (Matsumoto, 2002). Therefore, at least some of the 
downward forecasts in our sample do not bring new information and only reflect a correction to optimism, which suggests 
that the average information content of upward and downward analyst forecasts is not equal.  
13 
 
after analyst forecasts exhibit a strong upward movement, whereas the returns of large companies do 
not.
14
 
 
To examine whether the adjustment period has completely eliminated the undepricing, or 
whether some of it is resolved around earnings announcements we also analyze market adjusted 
cumulative returns around earnings announcement (trading days -5, 0; as in Cornell et al., 2002). The 
results are shown in Panel C. For both upward and downward forecasts we observe that for smaller 
companies there is an upward movement in prices irrespective of the earnings surprise (as 
documented by Ball and Kothari, 1991), which creates a size effect of 50 basis points. This suggests 
that some of the pessimism induced by the preceding analyst forecasts is corrected around the 
announcement date. 
 
Zhang (2006), also studies investor response to analyst forecasts when information 
uncertainty is higher. One of his proxies for uncertainty is company size because, similarly to our 
intuition, he suggests that the accuracy of forecasts for smaller companies is more difficult to predict. 
He reports a size effect only in response to upward revisions, but no size effect after downward 
revisions. Our analysis, however, is slightly different because we are testing whether a size effect 
exists only in the adjustment period, whereas Zhang measures total post-revision returns. If we 
combine impact and adjustment periods the total average returns of small (large) companies after a 
downward revision is -2.11% (-1.94%), which implies an annualized size effect comparable to 
Zhang’s findings. 
 
Several authors have documented an aggregate cross sectional size effect (Banz 1981, 
Reinganum 1981, Fama and French 1992). Under our hypothesis this size effect may also be partly 
related to ambiguity.
 15
 Anderson et al (2009) provide some supportive evidence for this claim as they 
                                                 
14
 Constructing the portfolios on value weighted basis does not change any of these conclusions. These results are available 
upon request. 
15 The notion that the aggregate size premium reflects ambiguity has been first proposed in the literature by Olsen and 
Troughton (2000).  
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report that the correlation between their ambiguity measure and the Small minus Big (SMB) portfolio 
is 0.24.  
 
Overall, the behaviour of returns in the adjustment stage is as predicted by the ambiguity 
aversion hypothesis: because of ambiguous forecasts, investors overweight pessimistic scenarios, and 
consequently set prices too low, generating an economically and statistically significant size effect in 
the period around earnings announcements.  
 [Please insert Table 5 here] 
 
3.3. Multivariate analysis  
We now examine the robustness of results in a multivariate setting. Table 6 Panels A and B, show the 
analysis for downward and upward forecasts respectively. The results are consistent with the 
univariate analysis. Adjustment period returns for upward and downward forecasts increase when the 
revision is targeted towards smaller companies. We also find that the upward movement in prices 
increases with the forecast horizon and decrease with signed forecast error.
16
 
 
 [Please insert Table 6 here] 
4. Concluding remarks  
In neoclassical theories investment decisions are made under conditions of risk, where investors have 
access to sufficient information to calculate the distribution of expected returns. However, in reality, 
the available information in some cases will be scanty or unreliable, preventing precise identification 
of this distribution. Several authors have documented that investors are averse to such ambiguity and 
price assets pessimistically, which generates an ambiguity premium.  
 
In this study we examine whether the previously documented unconditional size effect around 
earnings announcements reflects an ambiguity premium. Our hypothesis is that analyst forecasts for 
                                                 
16
 Long horizon forecasts can also be seen as more ambiguous as it is more difficult to estimate their accuracy due to lack of 
information. Therefore, the positive relationship between horizon and adjustment period returns may reflect also pessimism.    
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smaller companies are relatively more ambiguous; therefore investors respond pessimistically towards 
them due to ambiguity aversion. Then, as the quarter comes to a close and ambiguity is gradually 
resolved, prices rise to correct previous pessimism and generate the documented size effect. 
 
 In ours tests we first confirm that the accuracy of forecasts for smaller companies is more 
difficult to estimate from available information. According to the definitions of ambiguity provided 
by Daniel Ellsberg and others, this amounts to higher ambiguity. Second, we demonstrate that after an 
initial “impact” period, stock returns of small companies show evidence of pessimism, by rising 
significantly during an “adjustment” period regardless of the sign of the revision. No such increase is 
observed after revisions for larger companies. These results support our hypothesis that ambiguity 
aversion relates to the documented size effect around earnings announcements.     
 
Appendix 
 
The exposition below follows closely the model by Kelsey et al. (2010). It also draws on the model by 
Epstein and Schneider (2008). The model aims to illustrate the precise mechanism underlying our 
hypothesis, and to highlight that our results cannot be explained in a risk-only Bayesian framework. In 
the model we have three periods, one representative risk-neutral agent and one risky asset, which pays 
all earnings as dividends. 
 
In period 0 the agent has some prior about the dividend, and sets the price. In period 1 the 
agent receives a signal (either risky or ambiguous), and revises the price. In the third period we 
assume that risk or ambiguity are partly resolved, so the price changes once more. The intuition of the 
resolution is that as the terminal date approaches (i.e., when the dividend is revealed) the market is 
exposed to more information, which helps resolve some of the existing risk or ambiguity. We examine 
price changes in the adjustment period and highlight that our empirical findings, i.e., the upward 
movement in prices after good and bad news forecasts, only obtains when we allow the signal to be 
ambiguous and the investor to be ambiguity averse. 
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To draw a parallel between the model and our empirical work, the first period is where 
investors receive the analyst forecast, so prices are updated. In the second period, as the quarter comes 
to a close, more information is revealed which help resolve some of the risk or ambiguity in the 
forecast, causing another round of price changes (i.e., our adjustment period in the event study). This 
assumption is backed by empirical evidence such as Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Campbell et al. 
(2008). 
In period 0 the agent has a non-ambiguous prior for dividends as            . Abstracting 
from background wealth, and assuming risk neutrality, we can express the agent’s utility function as 
         . In each period the demand function of the agent is          . The market 
clearing condition is that in equilibrium excess demand is 0, so        . Under these assumptions 
the price in period 0 is      .             
 
Period 1: The agent receives a signal about dividends,       , where            . The quality 
of the signal is depicted by its variance, Vds. High variance implies low quality (ds is a weak predictor 
of d) and vice versa. In situations of pure risk the agent has complete knowledge of this variance. 
However, in ambiguous cases the variance can vary between a low and a high value, i.e.,     
                 . In this case the agent cannot disentangle whether the signal is of high or low 
quality, which is the standard exposition of ambiguity (i.e., Epstein and Schneider 2008). We can 
further assume that the true precision of the signal (i.e., the one that the agent uses when the situation 
only involves risk) lies somewhere between the two extremes, i.e.,                       . 
As explained in Epstein and Schneider (2008) in conditions of ambiguity the ambiguity averse agent 
updates his beliefs in response to the signal pessimistically (i.e., based on the worst case scenario). 
This means that if the signal conveys good news (ds>dp) the agent believes that the signal is relatively 
imprecise, so he updates believing that           . On the contrary, if the signal conveys bad 
news (ds<dp) he updates believing that the signal is very precise           .  
 
Pricing in Period 1: 
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Assume for now that the signal is risky. The price in period 1 using Bayes rule is: 
           (
   
        
    
   
      
  ), which is a precision weighted average of the priors, dp and the new 
information, ds. The price change is equal to:       (
   
        
    
   
      
  )     = 
   
         
   
      
  .  
From this equation it is clear that bad news (ds<dp) cause a drop in the price and good news cause an 
increase in price. In addition, all else equal, the absolute price change is larger when the variance of 
the signal Vds reduces (i.e., when quality of he signal increases).  
 
Pricing in Period 2: 
In this period we assume that some of the uncertainty in the signal is reduced, so its variance 
decreases,         . This causes a further update to the price equal to: 
      
   
  [            
      
   ]
    
      
       
       
   
. In risky conditions the variance of the signal Vds2 is always 
smaller than Vds. (This is because we have assumed some resolution). Therefore, the second bracketed 
term in the numerator is always positive, so prices in the second period always move in the direction 
implied by the signal. That is, if the signal is bad news (ds<dp), the price change is negative and if it 
was good news news (ds>dp) the price change is positive. Note that this is not what we observe in the 
data as we observe an upward movement in prices after both good and bad news. Therefore, the risk-
only framework cannot explain our findings. 
 
Let’s now assume that the signal was ambiguous, and that it brought bad news. Under the 
pessimism framework explained above the initial change in price is       
      
         
   
         
  . Note 
that in this case Vds is replaced with Vds,MIN ,which implies that the agent is acting as if the signal is 
more precise than it really is. This effectively increases the weight put on the signal, and sends the 
price lower, compared to the risk-only case. Again the second period brings some resolution, but this 
time to the ambiguity created by the signal. Such a resolution implies that both Vds,MAX and Vds,MIN are 
drawn closer to the true variance Vds reducing the amount of ambiguity. Therefore in period 2 pricing 
is driven by the new lower bound Vds,MIN2 > Vds,MIN , which implies that the agent realizes that the 
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signal is not an informative as he though in the beginning. The change in prices is then:       
   
  [               
         
   ]
    
         
       
          
   
. In this case, since both ds - dp and        
         
   are negative, so 
the change in price is positive. 
Let’s now assume that the ambiguous signal brought good news. Under the pessimism the 
initial change in price is       
      
         
   
         
  . Note that in this case Vds is replaced with Vds,MAX 
,which implies that the agent is acting as if the signal is less precise than it really is. The second 
period brings some resolution to the existing ambiguity, which implies that  in period 2 pricing is 
driven by the new upper bound Vds,MAX2 < Vds,MAX. The change in prices is then:       
   
  [               
         
   ]
    
         
       
          
   
. In this case, since both ds - dp and        
         
   are positive, the 
change in price is also positive. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for analyst forecasts 
This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A presents the distribution for some of the variables used. Panels B presents forecast frequencies partitioned by revision direction and 
company size. To assign companies in size quintiles in month t+1 we use the breakpoints from Kenneth French’s website in month t.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Units of measurement Mean Q1 Median Q3 
 
 Company experience Months analyst follows firm 36.97 10 23 50 
 
 Broker size Number of analysts employed in brokerage in year t 58.76 23 50 90 
 
 Companies Number of companies followed by analyst in year t 17 12 16 21 
 
 Forecast frequency Number of forecasts issued by analyst 3.65 2 3 4 
 
 Forecast horizon Days between forecast and earnings announcement 68.56 49 79 88 
 
 Industries Number of industries followed by analyst in year t 4.7 3 4 6 
 
 Revision magnitude (Forecast-previous forecast)/previous forecast *100 -4.34% -11.76% -2.44% 5.55% 
 
 Company size decile Using end of previous month breakpoints 6.5 4 7 9 
 
 Forecast error  (forecast - actual)/actual*100 -4.51% -11.36% -3.48% 0.00% 
 
       
  Panel B: Frequencies 
     
 
 By revision direction: Rev > 0 Rev < 0 Total 
  
  
114,409 150,554 264,963 
  
       
 
By size quintile: Small 2 3 4  Large 
 
Rev < 0 20,378 23,956 26,391 33,846 45,983 
  Rev > 0 11,388 15,245 19,487 26,969 41,320 
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Table 2: The Forecast accuracy model. 
This table reports estimates from an OLS regression of forecast accuracy 
(defined in equation 1) on company experience (the years that analyst i 
has followed company j), broker size (the number of analysts employed in 
the brokerage of analyst i who issued the revision), companies (the 
number of companies followed by analyst i in year t), forecast frequency 
(the number of forecasts issued by analyst i for company j in year t and 
quarter q), days elapsed (the days that separate the forecast made by 
analyst i for company j in year t and quarter q with any other forecast by 
any analyst for the same company and period), forecast horizon (the days 
that separate the forecast made by analyst i for company j and the 
corresponding earnings announcement date), industries (the number of 4-
digit SIC codes followed by analyst i in year t) and lag accuracy (the 
absolute error of the last forecast made by analyst i for company j in the 
previous quarter). These variables (except lag accuracy) are standardised 
according to equation 2. We cluster standard errors ate the firm level and 
use year fixed effects.   
 
 Parameter Estimate p-value 
intercept a 0.609 <.0001 
company experience β1 -0.003 0.199 
broker size β2 0.002 0.199 
Companies β3 -0.009 0.001 
forecast frequency β4 0.006 0.003 
days elapsed β5 -0.045 <.0001 
forecast horizon β6 -0.155 <.0001 
Industries β7 -0.009 0.001 
lag accuracy β8 0.098 <.0001 
Pr>F   <.0001 
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Table 3 : Regression of Returns on accuracy related variables. 
 
This table reports estimates from an OLS regression of cumulative market adjusted 
return from trading days -1 to 1 (where date 0 is the date the forecast was issued) on 
the accuracy related variables defined in table 2. These variables are interacted with 
revision magnitude ((New value – old value)/old value). We cluster standard errors 
ate the firm level and use year fixed effects.    
 
 
 Estimate p-value 
Intercept a -0.001 0.087 
Rev Magn. β1 0.046 <.0001 
company experience*Rev Magn. β2 -0.005 0.013 
broker size*Rev Magn. β3 0.007 0.0004 
Companies*Rev Magn β4 0.010 0.0007 
forecast frequency*Rev Magn β5 0.012 <.0001 
days elapsed*Rev Magn β6 -0.029 <.0001 
forecast horizon*Rev Magn β7 0.027 <.0001 
Industries*Rev Magn β8 -0.006 0.027 
lag accuracy*Rev Magn β 9 0.017 <.0001 
Pr>F   <.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Measuring ambiguity. 
This table reports estimates from an OLS regression of actual accuracy 
(defined in equation 1) on expected accuracy (defined in equation 4), with 
dummy variables that indicate the size quintile of the company for which 
the forecast is issued. D1 equals to 1 if the size of the company belongs in 
the 2, 3 or 4th quintile, and 0 otherwise. D2 equals to 1 if the size of the 
company belongs in quintile 1 and 0 otherwise. We use cluster standard 
errors ate the fir, level and use year fixed effects. 
 
 
Parameter Estimate P-value 
Intercept a0 
0.336 <.0001 
Dmidsize (D1) a1 
0.039 0.001 
Dsmall (D2) a2 
0.084 <.0001 
expected Accuracy θ1 
0.716 <.0001 
Expected accuracy*Dmidsize θ2 
-0.104 <.0001 
Expected accuracy*Dsmall θ3 
-0.237 <.0001 
Pr > F 
  
  
<.0001 
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Table 5: Impact and adjustment period returns around analyst earnings forecasts 
 
This table reports mean market adjusted returns partitioned by revision 
direction and size quintile. Panel A (B) presents returns in the impact 
(adjustment) period after upward (Rev>0) and downward (Rev<0) 
forecasts. Panel C presents mean returns around the earnings 
announcements (-5, 0) associated with upward and downward forecasts. 
The table provides p-values for the significance of the differentials 
calculated using standard errors adjusted for unequal variances. 
  
 
Panel A : (-2,2) Panel B: (3,20) 
Company Size Rev <0 Rev > 0 Rev <0 Rev > 0 
1(Large) -1.55 1.19 -0.39 0.05 
2 -1.72 1.96 -0.06 0.13 
3 -2.35 2.26 -0.03 0.13 
4 -2.49 2.69 0.27 0.48 
5(Small) -2.53 2.47 0.42 0.77 
Dif. 5-1 -0.98 1.28 0.81 0.72 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Panel C: earnings announcements (-5,0) 
  
1(Large) -0.12 0.51 
  
2 0.26 0.61 
  
3 0.57 0.68 
  
4 0.45 0.91 
  
5(Small) 0.37 1.06 
  
Dif. 5-1 0.49 0.55 
  
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001   
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Table 6: Multivariate analysis. 
This table reports estimates from OLS regressions of market adjusted returns in the 
adjustment period (3,20) for downward (Panel A) and upward (Panel B) forecasts. The 
explanatory variables are: the inverse of the logarithm of company size (price 3 days prior to 
the forecast x shares outstanding), average bid ask spread 20 days prior to the announcement 
of the forecast, forecast horizon (the days that separate a forecast from the corresponding 
earnings announcement date), broker size (the number of analysts employed in the brokerage 
during the year the analyst has issued a forecast), forecast error (the difference between 
forecasted value and actual value, scaled by actual value) and revision magnitude (the 
absolute value of the difference between the two most recent forecasts issued by analyst i for 
company j during period t, scaled by the penultimate forecast). We use cluster standard errors 
ate the firm level and use year fixed effects. 
 
  
Panel A: Rev < 0 Panel B: Rev >0 
Variable Parameter Estimate Pr > |t| Estimate Pr > |t| 
intercept a -0.039 <.0001 -0.021 <.0001 
1/log(size) 
b1 0.079 0.0006 
0.077 
0.001 
Bid/ask 
b2 0.0001 0.902 
-0.001 
-1.18 
Forecast Horizon 
b3 0.0002 <.0001 
0.0001 
<.0001 
Broker size 
b4 0.000 0.637 
0.000 
0.471 
Forecast error 
b5 -0.0185 <.0001 
-0.027 
<.0001 
Rev. magn. 
b6 0.001 0.684 
0.01 
0.002 
N 
  148,520 
 
113,516 
Pr > F 
  <.0001 
 
<.0001 
 
 
 
